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ABSTRACT 
Neil Weinberg: The Failing Agenda 
(Under the direction of Terry Sullivan) 
 
 Scholars of the presidency have focused their attention on the factors that correlate with 
legislative success while also assuming that presidents want to avoid legislative failures at all 
costs. However, researchers have yet to advance an explanation for why presidential policy 
proposals succeed at such a low rate when presidents should be able to avoid these types of 
failures if they wished based on their knowledge of those correlates of success. This paper 
examines previous work on presidential success in Congress and hypothesizes about factors that 
could lead presidents to intentionally pursue items that are likely to fail. Those hypotheses are 
then used to develop a theory of presidential motivation – that presidents seek the maximum 
possible effect on public policy outcomes – by which we can better evaluate American 
presidents. I conclude by discussing the implications of this theory for future study of the 
presidency. 
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1 
Congressmen are “single-minded seekers of reelection.” That is the way David Mayhew 
(1974) put it forty years ago when positing a motivating assumption by which we could 
understand members of Congress. Plenty have followed and improved upon Mayhew’s ideas and 
methodology in the four decades since he wrote The Electoral Connection, but he framed nearly 
all future discussion of Congress with that simple phrase. The presidency has no such phrase. 
Perhaps Richard Neustadt’s “presidential power is the power to persuade” comes close, but 
Neustadt’s words do not provide a motivating assumption. Most work that studies presidential 
success or efficiency imposes a set of goals upon presidents rather than seeking to discover what 
it is that motivates them. We know a great deal about what presidents do, but much less about 
why they do it. 
Scholars have done a tremendous amount of research in the field of presidential 
policymaking in Congress, but at best, that work only hints at the factors that motivate presidents 
in the domestic policy arena. The factors presented in the literature center around the desire to 
win votes on which the president takes a position. Jeffrey Cohen (2012, 5) illustrates this view 
quite well: 
This congressional anticipations theory thus begins with a simple assumption: that 
presidents do not want Congress to defeat their legislative proposals because of the cost 
of such defeats. 
 
The current theme of motivation throughout the literature should lead us to predict that 
presidents will never willingly take positions on items on which they expect to fail. The factors 
that determine congressional voting behavior should allow presidents to predict the outcome of 
votes at a reasonably high rate, but we observe presidential success rates that are significantly 
lower than those predictions, meaning that presidents are either unable to correctly make these 
predictions or that they are motivated by something other than a simple desire to win votes.  
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 This paper presents a theory of presidential motivation and proposes ways to build our 
measures of effectiveness around that motivation. If our goal is to measure presidential 
influence, then doing so properly requires that we calibrate our metrics to align with what 
presidents are actually trying to achieve. To generate that theory of presidential motivation, I will 
hypothesize about the causes of one of the most startling disconnects in the literature; the high 
degree of presidential failure despite theories of the presidency that seem to predict very little.  
I propose five explanations for this level of failure: ignorance, electoral, uncertainty, 
agenda setting, and strategic. Those hypotheses center around a single theory that not only 
explains the prevalence of presidential failure in Congress, but other presidential behavior as 
well. The motivation I present here is simple - Presidents seek the maximum possible effect on 
public policy outcomes - but carries with it a number of important consequences and future 
avenues for research that I will discuss in the conclusion of the paper, specifically that our 
measures of presidential success need to focus on policy outcomes rather than legislative 
procedure and that current theories of presidential leadership are too reliant on theories of 
legislatures.  
A THEORY OF THE FAILING AGENDA 
 Despite a substantial amount of research on presidential success in Congress, the 
literature lacks a true theory of presidential motivation. Existing theories of the presidency tend 
to focus on how presidents do things, rather than what they are trying to achieve when they 
pursue a given strategy. Studies of presidential-congressional relations often assume a motivating 
theme, the desire to win important votes on which the president has taken a position, but that 
theme regularly conflicts with the reality the authors go on to present. That particular assumption 
shows up across the standard literature on presidential success in Congress. Anthony King (1983, 
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247) delivers a clear articulation saying “all [the president] really need from Congress is votes, 
but you need those votes very badly.’’ George Edwards (1989, 4) agreed that ‘‘Presidential 
leadership of Congress typically revolves around obtaining or maintaining support for the chief 
executive’s legislative stances’’ (see also Edwards 1980, Bond and Fleisher 1990; Bond, 
Fleisher, and Krutz 1996; Covington, Wrighton, and Kinney 1995; Fleisher and Bond 2000).  
Most of these studies conclude that the partisan, ideological, and leadership makeup of 
the chamber largely determine success (Bond and Fleisher 1990, Edwards 1980, Rivers and Rose 
1985). Additional work follows along with this line of reasoning and suggests that presidents 
“strategically” pursue only those agenda items which will pass in Congress (Edwards 2009, 
Cohen 2012). Together, past work on the matter predicts that presidents will very rarely take a 
position on a vote in Congress that they expect to lose and some of that work predicts that they 
will almost never take such a position. Cohen (2012, 4-5) offers a recent articulation of this view. 
He writes: 
I offer a theory, congressional anticipations, that resolves both of these puzzles. The core 
tenet of this theory is that presidents take into account the congressional environment 
when deciding which proposals to submit to Congress. That is, they calculate the 
likelihood that Congress will enact the proposal. For reasons noted earlier,
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 presidents 
want to avoid being defeated by Congress. If presidents expect a proposal to be defeated, 
they have several ways to minimize being defeated. First, a president can decide not to 
submit a proposal to Congress. Second, presidents can modify their proposals to increase 
the likelihood that Congress will enact them. Third, presidents can collect resources to 
improve their bargaining situation with Congress, using those resources to increase the 
likelihood that Congress will approve and not defeat their proposals. Presidents engage in 
these strategic behaviors to minimize being defeated because presidents view 
congressional defeat of their legislative proposals as costly.  
 
This congressional anticipations theory thus begins with a simple assumption: that 
presidents do not want Congress to defeat their legislative proposals because of the cost 
of such defeats. 
 
                                               
1Cohen (2012, 3) is referring to this line: “Being defeated can be costly to a president. Defeat can harm a president’s 
leadership image and undermine his public support.” 
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The empirical reality contrasts with a key tenet of the congressional anticipations theory 
(CAT). Presidents routinely take positions on bills in Congress that are “dead on arrival,” when 
in fact the absence of “dead on arrival” legislation is a logical requirement of CAT. CAT and 
related work imply that presidents should devote a great deal of effort into predicting how 
Congress will receive a given proposal, that presidents should make reasonably accurate 
predictions about that reception, and that presidents will never propose something that has no 
chance of passing because their primary goal is to avoid costly defeats.  
In addition, presidents simply lose congressional votes at a reasonably high rate, which 
CAT would not expect because CAT argues that presidents would gauge the congressional 
response before making the proposal and then alter the proposal such that Congress would accept 
it. A “loss” in this context is when a president supports a bill that doesn’t make it to a vote, 
supports a bill that makes it to a final vote and fails, or opposes a bill that passes. This literature 
argues that presidents have the ability and desire to make accurate predictions about a bill’s 
prospects and that presidents want to avoid defeat at all costs, but then fails to speak to the vast 
amount of failure we observe in the data. Collectively, their analyses speak to what factors are 
correlated with success but they do not address how successful presidents should be given their 
predictive power and assumed motivation.  
While we should not expect all theories of politics to work perfectly in all settings, the 
vast amount of this type of “presidential failure” should lead us to reconsider the motivations we 
attach to presidents. Existing work suggests that presidents know which bills are likely to pass 
and that they will devote their limited time and resources toward the passage of those bills, yet 
time and time again, presidents spend time on issues that have very little future in Congress. 
Explaining why they do that, and specifically why they often make a conscious choice to fail (or 
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to care very little about the costs of failure), will help us understand their goals and aspirations 
while in office, which will lead us to make better predictions about presidential behavior and 
strategy in the future.  
MEASURING PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS 
 Domestic policy failure in Congress varies across time, president, partisan alignment and 
a set of other factors, but the important thing to note at first is that failure is ever-present. Even 
the most “successful” presidents fail more often than we would predict based on existing work 
and some presidents fail a shockingly high amount of the time. To measure success Bond and 
Fleisher (1990) make use of Roll Call votes, Edwards (1980) uses presidential support scores 
which track how often a given member supports the president when the president takes a 
position, Cohen (2012) uses how often presidential proposals are adopted, and Beckmann (2010) 
looks at how often something the president supports becomes law and how often something they 
oppose fails. No matter how you look at it, presidents never achieve the level of success we 
would anticipate if they were simply trying to maximize their success rate.  
Discovering the reasons why presidents fail when our current understanding suggests that 
they have the ability and desire to avoid it should help us derive a theory of presidential 
motivation by which we can evaluate future presidents. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of House Roll Call Votes in which the president’s side “won,” 1953-2004 
(n=3,044). Source: Policy Agendas Project. 
 
 If you simply look at House Roll Call Votes on which the president took a position and 
at least 15 percent of the chamber voted on each side (Figure 1), you find that the average 
success rate (the number of wins divided by the total number of positions)  for presidents 
between 1953 and 2004 is only 58 percent. As we would expect, there is variation from year to 
year based on partisanship, ideology, and other factors we associate with success in Congress, 
but if presidents were actively trying to only take positions on bills on which they expected to 
win, they should be able to do much better.  
Estimates vary across the literature, but predicting Roll Call voting with party, ideology, 
leadership, and other simple factors should allow the president to guess the outcome of the vote 
somewhere around 75 to 80 percent of the time (Poole and Rosenthal 1985). In other words, we 
would expect presidential success to look more like the dashed line in Figure 2, which is simply 
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the data from Figure 1 transformed to center on a 78 percent success rate. 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of House Roll Call Votes in which the president’s side “won,” 1953-2004 
(n=3,044) with expected winning percentage. Source: Policy Agendas Project. 
 
If presidents really only wanted to select into battles that they expected to win in 
Congress, their success rate should match the level with which they would be able to predict the 
outcome of votes. Poole and Rosenthal correctly predicted more than three quarters of Roll Call 
votes using very simple predictors, meaning that presidents should do no worse on average 
considering that they also have access to information about what members have said about the 
particular issue as well as their voting history and partisan leanings. It does not appear that 
presidents are only selecting into battles they expect to win when looking at Roll Call Votes, but 
using Roll Call data actually belies the discrepancy.  
If we bring in data that includes both houses and includes those issues on which no vote 
is ever held, presidential success is even lower. Considering the population of important 
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domestic issues that were proposed in Congress from 1953 to 2004 on which the president took a 
position (Beckmann 2010), the presidential success rate is actually closer to 48 percent. The 
dotted line in Figure 3 represents important domestic policy issues proposed in Congress and 
how often a law passed when the president supported it and how often no new law passed when 
the president opposed it. 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of House Roll Call Votes in which the president’s side “won,” 1953-2004 
(n=3,044) with expected winning percentage. Sources: Policy Agendas Project, Beckmann 
(2010).  
 
Figure 4 shows the simple regression line for each of the lines in Figure 3 and provides a 
better visualization of the difference. Over time, presidents should be successful about 75 to 80 
percent of the time if they are catering their positions and proposals to Congress with the goal of 
maximizing their winning percentage. When only accounting for a single chamber, the House, 
they do far worse. When accounting for both chambers and allowing for situations in which a 
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final vote is never held, they do worse still.  
 
Figure 4: Basic regression lines using data from Figure 3. 
 
It is important to note that the sample size for the dotted line is much smaller (n = 534), 
but the point holds regardless. Presidents are much less successful on average than we would 
expect them to be given their ability to predict the outcome of votes in Congress. Cohen (2012, 
237) reports aggregate presidential success from the first through one hundredth Congress and 
this proves to be anything but a modern phenomenon. His definition of agenda differs slightly 
from Beckmann’s, so a one to one comparison is not perfect, but presidents tend to be successful 
on about 20 percent of their overall proposals during that time period with a maximum success 
rate of 64.5 percent. Cohen is making an argument that presidents anticipate the reaction of 
Congress when making proposals and then shows presidents tend to succeed infrequently.  
No matter how you approach the question, presidents never arrive at anything close to a 
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75 to 80 percent success rate on average. Most measures place presidential success in the 45 to 
55 percent range, but some measures mark it lower. What is driving the difference between the 
success rate presidents should be able to achieve and the one they are actually obtaining? 
AN EXPLANATION OF PRESIDENTIAL FAILURE 
Presidents lose more often than we would expect them to if they were simply trying to 
submit only those proposals that Congress is willing to adopt and the difference between what 
existing theory predicts and the amount of failure we observe is interesting and worthy of 
explanation. Understanding what drives this gap will help us theorize about what motivates 
presidents and that will, in turn, help us better explain and predict their behavior.  
We can dismiss two simple responses to the difference between the predicted amount of 
failure and the reality up front as incomplete. First, this is not simply an electoral phenomenon. 
While presidents likely take all sorts of positions that serve the interest of their reelection, they 
continue to engage in this behavior during their second term. Perhaps they are attempting to 
build the party brand for future elections, but we would certainly expect to observe much more 
failure in the first term than the second if the Electoral Explanation was responsible for most of 
the disconnect, but that is not the case.  
Figure 5 divides the House Roll Call data by term showing that, on average, presidents 
win a lower percentage of Roll Call votes in their second terms. Figure 6 shows the same 
division broken down by president, showing that every president during this period who won a 
second term won a lower percentage of votes after they were reelected. Figure 7 divides the same 
data by term and by majority status, showing minority presidents did worse collectively in their 
second terms. Majority presidents did better, but that is a function of Johnson’s high overall 
success rate, as he is the only second term majority president in the data. 
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Figure 5: Percentage of House Roll Call Votes in which the president’s side “won” when the 
president took a position by term, 1953-2004 (n=3,044). Source: Policy Agendas Project. 
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Figure 6: Percentage of House Roll Call Votes in which the president’s side “won” when the 
president took a position by individual term, 1953-2004 (n=3,044). Source: Policy Agendas 
Project. 
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Figure 7: Percentage of House Roll Call Votes in which the president’s side “won” when the 
president took a position by term and partisan control, 1953-2004 (n=3,044). *NOTE: The only 
majority second term president in the data set is Lyndon Johnson.* Source: Policy Agendas 
Project. 
 
Additionally, it is very unlikely that we can explain the entirety of the remaining gap with 
ignorance on the part of the president. The people crafting legislative strategy in the White 
House are frequently long-time Washington insiders who have both the expertise and 
connections to assess the a bill’s viability before devoting resources to its passage. Beyond that, 
the first and second term trends above dampen this explanation as well. Presidents should get 
better at avoiding these doomed positions as they spend more and more time in office, but that 
simply is not the case. This is not to say that presidents never mistakenly pursue an item they 
should not have, but rather that the Ignorance Explanation is incomplete.  
 Both the Electoral and Ignorance explanations are important pieces of the puzzle, but 
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they are both easily understood and uncontroversial. In fact, they are essentially default themes 
of motivation that scholars recognize and take for granted. Sometimes presidents will pursue a 
bill for symbolic electoral reasons and they will occasionally misread the political situation in 
Congress and pursue a bill they would not otherwise have purused if they had more information, 
but those two explanations do not account for all of the failure that we observe. In order to do 
that, we must consider three additional reasons that presidents might fail in the domestic policy 
arena. 
UNCERTAINTY 
 The first of those reasons is uncertainty. The Uncertainty Explanation suggests that 
presidents are fully aware that a given bill’s prospects are low, but they make the decision that 
the payoff is high enough that they should pursue it anyway. This explanation runs against the 
belief that presidents will choose to avoid any bills that are unlikely to pass regardless of the 
possible payoff. Current theory suggests that presidents will only pursue bills on which they are 
likely to win, but the Uncertainty Explanation proposes that they will pursue any agenda item 
that has a positive expected payoff. In other words, they are willing to go after big ticket items 
that are likely doomed because the reward for success is so high. More importantly, while the 
president knows that the five important bills in front of him or her each have a 20 percent 
likelihood of success, the president does not know which one of the bills will be the one to pass 
so he or she must pursue them all if they are hunting to impact public policy at all. This is a very 
difficult proposition to test empirically, but it is important to consider theoretically.  
Current Theory: Presidents will only pursue items that are likely to pass in Congress, 
(i.e. pursuit will be a function of the odds of winning). 
 
Hypothesis 1: Presidents will pursue items that have a positive expected payoff, (i.e. 
pursuit will be a function of the odds of winning and the payoff of winning). 
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 The common view is that presidents will only pursue items that are very likely to pass 
and given the ease with which presidents should be able to predict outcomes on the floor, they 
should fail infrequently. However, if presidents instead pursue items that return a positive 
expected payoff, then you would expect to see failure quite often because the odds of success on 
any one bill are low. This would not be a matter of ignorance, as mentioned above, but rather an 
indication that presidents care more about winning big than they do about winning in general. 
They are willing to bet on long odds because the bills with long odds are the bills about which 
they care the most and because they have no way of knowing which proposal will lead to the big 
payoff. Cohen (2012) proposes that losing is costly, but the potential payoff offsets those 
potential costs in many cases. 
 One could almost think of the Uncertainty Explanation in the language of Granovetter’s 
(1978) threshold model. In this case, presidents have very low thresholds for pursuing an agenda 
item, but cannot observe the thresholds of members of Congress which leads presidents to 
attempt action on multiple low percentage propositions with the hope of finding the one that will 
generate a policy change. Granovetter uses riots as an example, so the equivalent here is that 
presidents are running around Washington smashing windows hoping that Congress will riot 
with the idea that at some point, the president will find the storefront that Congress is willing to 
loot. We could also expand this into a broader cue-taking model in which the president is giving 
the strongest signals to other members and their involvement on an issue will lead others to act 
some percentage of the time. This would lead to all sorts of failure because the president does not 
know when the time is right to pursue a given issue, but sees it as his or her job to ignite debates 
that lead to legislative action. In other words, presidents see it as their role to go after issues that 
have low odds of success with the understanding that eventually one of those pursuits will lead to 
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a major policy change.  
 Nailing down the Uncertainty Explanation empirically is challenging because obtaining a 
set systematic predictions from presidents on the probability of success that occurred prior to the 
president making a proposal or taking a position would not be feasible. There are many instances 
in which we could gather individual data points, but not in a way that would be possible without 
substantial fears of selection bias. We can, however, take two approaches in future empirical 
research on the Uncertainty Explanation. First, we could formally model the process in a way 
that would help us understand the conditions under which this might occur. That would be 
useful, but few would likely challenge the premise that presidents could behave this way even 
before seeing a formal proof. The second strategy, which would provide a more serious empirical 
defense of the theory, would be to categorize presidential proposals based on their potential 
impact on public policy. From there, you could measure the success rate and would expect to 
observe a negative relationship when controlling for other explanations of success. This 
approach would require a very large data collection process and coding regiment that extends 
beyond the scope of this paper, but presidents should lose more often when the potential payoff 
is larger because the payoff rather than the probability of success would drive the expected value. 
In other words, presidents would want to win at a higher rate on low impact bills than on high 
impact bills. If one were to control for the specific president and their tenure, this would be 
suggestive of uncertainty as a driver of presidential failure.  
AGENDA SETTING  
 Presidents also might choose to pursue a doomed initiative for agenda setting purposes. 
The Agenda Setting Explanation proposes that the act of lobbying on behalf of an agenda item 
improves the probability that policy will change even if the policy does not change within the 
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president’s area of influence.  
Current Theory: Presidents do not attempt to use proposals in Congress as a means to 
influence outside political actors. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Presidents lead outside political actors to take up important issues on 
which the president was unable to win in Congress. 
 
This pursuit can have multiple targets, but the most concrete are other political actors 
working at the same time (states, municipalities, courts) or other actors working in the future 
(presidents, Congress, etc).This explanation suggests that presidents care about policy outcomes 
over who gets credit for those outcomes. If the president wants to improve access to health care, 
he or she should not care about which level of government enacts the policy, but instead about 
the actual tangible outcome. If presidents can influence state and judicial actors through their 
pursuit of an issue in Congress, then presidents would not have to actually “win” the vote in 
order to be successful.   
 When thinking about future actors, presidents are essentially doing the same thing but 
with an additional eye on their own legacy. A president in the 1830s would have had zero chance 
of passing a Constitutional amendment to protect the rights of blacks, but by making an attempt 
at passing such a measure, the president may have been laying the groundwork for an 
amendment that would come later. Not only would the president be signaling that an issue was 
important and worthy of attention, but they would also be cementing their own legacy as a leader 
on the issue. The time horizon does not have to be nearly so long, but the idea holds up even over 
a period of a few years. The act of pursuing an issue now has an effect on its passage in the 
future and reflects well on the president, both of which are important to the president.  
What matters here is the idea that presidents view pushing the boulder up the hill as an 
achievement in and of itself. They know that the given policy is unlikely to pass in Congress but 
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pursuing it there is a necessary step along the road to actual policy change. This feeling is 
evident in a 2014 speech by Barack Obama (Baker 2014, A13), who when speaking about the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act and his own agenda said: 
You’re reminded daily that in this great democracy, you are but a relay swimmer in the 
currents of history, bound by decisions made by those who came before, reliant on the 
efforts of those who will follow to fully vindicate your vision. But the presidency also 
affords a unique opportunity to bend those currents by shaping our laws and by shaping 
our debates, by working within the confines of the world as it is but also by reimagining 
the world as it should be. 
 
Regardless of the target, presidents recognize that there are other ways to impact policy aside 
from passing laws in Congress and they are doing their part to influence policy change elsewhere 
through their efforts in Congress. Presidents can serve as a cheerleader for important policies and 
impact public policy even when it looks like they “lost” on that issue. The Agenda Setting 
Explanation also predicts a great deal of failure because presidents will be pursuing all sorts of 
bills with the express goal of winning on the issue outside of the present debate with Congress. If 
the bill should happen to pass, they would be thrilled, but they would still consider it a victory if 
it laid the groundwork for other political action.  
 Like the Uncertainty Explanation, we cannot determine what a president intended on any 
one bill, but one thing this explanation posits is that the president can function as a policy 
innovator and leader in the diffusion process. Plenty of work shows that states lead other states 
(Walker 1969; Gray 1973; Downs 1976; Mintrom 1997; Baybeck, Berry and Siegel 2011) and 
that interest groups can be innovators in this process, so demonstrating that the president serves 
as an agenda setter for other political actors would just be a matter of future research placing the 
president’s policy proposals into the context of policy diffusion. All this would require is 
gathering and merging data on presidential proposals and positions in Congress with policy 
adoptions in the states, courts, or in future Congresses.  
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STRATEGIC 
 Finally, presidents choose to pursue doomed initiatives for strategic purposes. The 
Strategic Explanation proposes that presidents use bills as tools to influence members of 
Congress, particularly the leadership. This explanation suggests that presidents do not come to 
Congress hoping to win on the highest number of issues possible, but rather that they care about 
how much they move public policy. If this is the case, presidents will target agenda items that 
matter most to them and will attempt to move policy as close to their ideal point as possible on 
those issues. Previous work suggests that presidents are usually very effective at getting the issue 
they care about onto the congressional agenda (Edwards and Barrett 2000), but that it is more 
difficult to make sure Congress actually considers the specific policy they want to see enacted. 
Beyond that, most studies show presidents have a very limited effect when attempting to 
persuade members to change their minds on final floor votes. In other words, presidents need to 
make sure that the congressional leadership allows the presidential proposal to make it through 
the vetting process without drifting much from its original form, which means that presidents 
need to be able to exercise influence over congressional leaders on a certain set of bills most 
important to them. 
 One of the ways in which presidents can influence congressional leaders is by leveraging 
and trading away other bills about which they care less. As a result, presidents will end up failing 
on a whole host of bills that they used to win negotiations over an entirely different bill. Again, 
presidents pursue this strategy consciously, but when evaluating their performance based on Roll 
Call Votes or Presidential Success Scores, it looks like they are failing, when it reality they are 
doing exactly what they intended to do.  
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Current Theory: Presidents take positions on bills only because they want to see that 
policy enacted. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Presidents attempt to influence Members’ of Congress actions on certain 
bills through presidential action on separate bills.  
 
The next section contains a more comprehensive model of Strategic Failure, but the basic 
logic is that if a president can use a bill to influence the leadership on a second, more important 
bill then we would expect to see a higher rate of failure because presidents would intentionally 
take positions on issues with the intent to trade them away. If they end up winning on the 
secondary issue as well they would be pleased, but the primary goal is winning on the core 
agenda item. While we again cannot observe the direct calculations of the White House across 
every major bill, there are a number of artifacts of this process that we can observe in order to 
find support for this theory. 
A MODEL OF STRATEGIC FAILURE 
 The aim of this paper is not to categorize how often each explanation of failure occurs, 
but rather to argue that failure can often be a conscious and rational strategy in the pursuit of 
presidential goals. We know that presidents fail with regularity, so understanding why that is the 
case will help lead us toward an understanding of those goals. To that end, the Electoral, 
Ignorance, Uncertainty, and Agenda Setting explanations need little further explanation. Future 
work can and should focus on the frequency of these explanations and how effective they tend to 
be, but their logical foundations should be reasonably uncontroversial. Strategic Failure, on the 
other hand, is a more novel concept that requires further exploration. 
 The idea is grounded in the work of Beckmann (2010), who shows that presidents target 
their lobbying efforts at congressional leadership rather than individual members of Congress. 
This stands to reason, given that previous work has generally shown limited presidential ability 
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to influence members on final votes. Beckmann argues that presidents have the biggest 
opportunity to influence policy by shaping the reactions of both the supportive and opposition 
leaders in Congress. If the president can convince their party’s leader to not significantly alter the 
president’s preferred proposal and convince the opposition leader not to propose a serious 
alternative then the president has a much higher chance of seeing their ideal policy move through 
the chamber. Beckmann demonstrates that presidents engage in this type of lobbying, but does 
not expressly state how they are able to convince leaders to go along with them when they do. 
Strategic Failure offers an explanation of that process.  
 The process can work in two directions. First, a president can agree to pursue a bill that 
they know to have a low probability of success in exchange for the support of a key player. If an 
important leader or caucus member is on the fence about the president’s agenda item, the 
president may choose to support a separate policy proposal championed by that member in order 
to win their support in the early game lobbying of the issue most important to the president. This 
would lead us to expect a great deal of presidential failure because presidents would be choosing 
to pursue something not because they support it and think it has a good chance of success, but 
because supporting it was a necessary condition for success on something that they valued very 
highly. 
 Second, presidents can agree to abandon the pursuit of a bill in order to accommodate a 
key player in much the same way. If the critical member is on the fence about the president’s 
core agenda item but is very much opposed to a separate item on the president’s agenda, the 
president could agree to abandon the effort or allow the opposition to pursue their version of the 
bill in order to win over the support of the critical member on the primary issue. This would 
manifest itself in presidential proposals dying in Congress or the president losing on a final vote 
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because they would still take a position in opposition to the other side’s bill on the secondary 
issue, they just would not stand in the way of its movement through the process.  
 Built into this model is the idea that presidents have rank order preferences about their 
agenda (Light 1999), meaning that the same degree of movement on one policy is more valuable 
to the president than another. This allows the president to make these kinds of trades because 
giving a little on a couple of policies of secondary importance is outweighed by gaining a great 
deal on policies that are central to the president’s agenda. 
 
 
Figure 8: A policy space in which the status quo (SQ), opposition leader (OPP), median member 
(M), president (N), and supportive leader (SUPP) are arranged. The distance between two lines 
is one unit. 
 
 
Figure 9: Two policy spaces in which the status quo (SQ), opposition leader (OPP), median 
member (M), president (N), and supportive leader (SUPP) are arranged and the president cares 
twice as much about Policy A as he does Policy B. The distance between two lines is one unit. 
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 This idea of Strategic Failure is based simply on the idea that the president is thinking 
about multiple agenda items at one time and considers the interaction between and among them. 
Action on one issue can influence a separate issue. This is evident in Figures 8 and 9, which 
demonstrate that the president is capable of returning a higher net payoff in certain situations if 
they are willing to give in on a lesser issue.  
If the two party leaders have the option of accepting the president’s proposal and 
agreeing to let that bill reach the floor (N) or lobbying the median member (M), the choice they 
will make depends on the presence of other issues on the agenda. If the key players come to no 
prior agreement, they will end up with Ma, Mb. This gives the opposition leader a payoff of -4,
2
 
the president a payoff of 9, and the supportive leader a payoff of 6. If they agree to Na, -Nb, then 
the opposition leader gets a payoff of -3, the president gets a payoff of 10, and the supportive 
leader gets a payoff of 6. In the arrangement above, the president gets a higher payoff if he or she 
trades away the secondary issue in order to get a better outcome on the primary issue while the 
opposite leader is better off and the supportive leader is no worse. This can only work some of 
the time, but when it does work it makes failure a rational and helpful strategy.  
 If presidents engage in this type of behavior, we would expect to see their core agenda 
items make it further through the legislative process than the items on which they simply take a 
position and we would expect to see those bills be more successful in final votes.  
 Covington, Wrighton, and Kinney (1995) compared Bond and Fleisher (1990) style 
results to results that included a variable defining whether or not the issue was on the president’s 
agenda and found agenda to positively and significantly related to success when controlling for 
variables such as party, ideology, and leadership preference. Unfortunately, Covington, 
                                               
2
Payoffs in each Policy Space (A or B) are measured as the distance from the player to the status quo minus the 
distance from the player to the outcome.  
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Wrighton, and Kinney examine votes from the 1950s to 1970s, which features a very different 
level of partisanship than the present day. Fortunately, my analysis
3
 of Roll Call Votes using data 
from 1993 to 2004 confirms that whether or not the issue is on the president’s agenda is 
positively and statistically significantly related to success on the issue.  
 Table 1 is the output of two logistic regression models that predict whether or not the 
president won a Roll Call vote on which they took a position and at least 15 percent of the 
chamber voted on each side from 1993 to 2004. Model 1 includes congressional centered 
variables, such as whether or not the president was in the majority, the percentage of the chamber 
that was of the president’s party, whether or not the opposing party leader supported the 
president, and whether or not the supportive party leader supported the president. Model 2 
includes all of those variables and a variable that measures the degree to which the issue at hand 
was on the president’s agenda (off agenda, broad agenda, or core agenda) as defined by their 
most recent major address to Congress. All of the variables are significant in the expected 
direction, with the exception of the share of the chamber controlled by the president’s party. 
Majority status, support from each leader, and the centrality of the issue on the president’s 
agenda were all positive and significant predictors of presidential success during this time period, 
which supports Covington, Wrighton, and Kinney’s findings.  
                                               
3
Detailed description of the data and coding can be found in Section 2 of the Appendix along with predicted 
probabilities of success based on a certain variable profile. 
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 While this is an important finding, it also follows the previous work in that it analyzes 
only the outcomes of votes on which the president takes a position. If we expanded the analysis 
to include bills that never make it to a vote, the president’s success rate decreases further and 
additional artifacts of the Strategic Explanation emerge. Taking Beckmann’s sample of 769 
major domestic policy initiatives from 1953 to 2004 will allow us to look deeper.
4
  
 Here we find presidents are less successful in general (38% success rate) when taking 
into account bills that never make it to a final vote, but we can also see that success rate varies 
                                               
4
Detailed description of the data and coding can be found in Section 3 of the Appendix, along with accompanying 
regression outputs. 
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accordingly based on whether or not the president make a specific proposal and how engaged the 
White House was in the legislative debate. Beckmann’s data also includes both chambers in the 
process. Data on the Senate is largely consistent with the patterns presented here, but the 
available data is less complete, and so therefore, not presented with respect to Roll Call Vote and 
Success Scores.
5
 
 Figure 10 shows that presidents were much more successful (almost 30 percent) in 
passing a new law or stopping one they did not agree with when the White House made a 
proposal compared to when it simply got involved in a congressional proposal. Figure 11 shows 
that presidential success also increases as the president moves from no lobbying activity to 
taking a position to actively lobbying for support in Congress.  
 
 
Figure 10: Percentage of the time in which the president’s desired outcome resulted depending 
on whether or not the White House made a specific proposal on the issue, 1953 to 2004 (n = 450 
and 319). Source: Beckmann (2010). 
                                               
5
More detail is provided in Section 4 of the Appendix. 
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Figure 11: Percentage of the time in which the president’s desired outcome resulted depending 
on the degree to which the president was involved in the lobbying process, 1953 to 2004 (n = 
235, 168, and 366). Source: Beckmann (2010). 
  
While the regression results in the Appendix (Tables 2 and 3) show that partisan control 
has a positive and statistically significant effect on success rate in addition to the effect of 
lobbying and proposal status, Beckmann’s data makes the picture of presidential success look 
even worse. When accounting for the bills that fail to reach a final vote, the success rate of 
presidents who have majorities in both chambers falls to 59% (n=272). Presidents who face 
opposition in one chamber have a 23% success rate (n=163) and presidents who have face 
opposition control in both houses have a 29% success rate (n=334).  
This failure and the impact of presidential effort in Congress is not merely a partisan 
artifact. Instead, we see that presidents do much better than average when the issue appears to be 
central to their own agenda (when they make a specific proposal). Also, the data indicate that 
presidents are more likely to take a position when the issue is more likely to go their way, but 
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they are also much more likely to devote resources (lobby) to issues that have better odds still. It 
is impossible to know what would have happened if they had not lobbied on the issue, but this 
finding fits with the concept of strategic failure. Existing theories would not predict a distinction 
between the success rates when the president takes a position and when the president lobbies, but 
strategic failure would make that prediction because many of the times that the president takes a 
position, he has simply done so for strategic reasons. However, the president is much less willing 
to waste precious lobbying resources on issues he just intended to use strategically and has little 
expectation will succeed. 
Like the other explanations of failure, we cannot say with one hundred percent certainty 
what a president’s specific rationale was for each individual agenda item, but we can observe 
evidence that points to a set of common rationales and those rationales can help inform us about 
presidential motivation in general. Further work in this area should attempt to make use of 
archival materials including communications between the president and congressional leaders 
and among the president’s legislative team. It is likely not possible to develop a comprehensive 
sample that covers every important bill, but finding detailed communication that indicates this is 
a consideration would support the broader theory.  
TOWARD A THEORY OF PRESIDENTIAL MOTIVATION 
 The key to these explanations of failure is that they are not really failure at all. So much 
of the past work on the presidency has defined success and failure based on winning and losing 
votes or passing versus not passing legislation, but there are rational reasons why presidents 
might intentionally pursue something that they expect to lose.  
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Figure 12: A visual representation of the types of bills on which presidents must decide. 
 
There are essentially two types of bills; ones that are likely to pass and ones that are 
likely to fail. We can then divide those two groups up into bills the president supports and bills 
the president opposes. Existing work suggests the president will pursue only bills that they 
support and are likely to pass (solid), which in turn, predicts very little failure. Instead, I propose 
that presidents will pursue bills that they support and are likely to pass (solid) and a set of bills 
with low odds of success that they support when those bills can be useful to them in other ways 
(gradient). Certainly Edwards (2009) and Cohen (2012) are right that presidents make decisions 
based on anticipated the congressional response, but presidents do not need to anticipate a 
legislative victory in all cases in order to decide to pursue something. We know that presidents 
take positions on all sorts of bills that die in Congress or on which they lose when the bill 
reaches a final vote. Existing theory provides no account for why that occurs, so the reader is left 
to assume ignorance on the part of the president, or perhaps to infer electoral incentives.  
 Instead, I suggest that there are a variety of reasons why presidents might decide to 
pursue a bill or issue that has little chance of success in Congress. They understand the odds, but 
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they choose to pursue it anyway. Presidents might do this for electoral reasons, agenda setting 
purposes, strategic reasons, or because the risk is worth the expected reward. All of these 
explanations predict significant failure, which tracks well with reality, but they also point to a 
single theory of presidential motivation.  
What the explanations (except for ignorance) have in common is that president is forward 
looking and considers the long-term impact of his or her current decisions. In the Electoral 
Explanation, the president is pursuing an issue because it will help him or her return to office in 
order to continue to exert influence over public policy. In the Uncertainty Explanation, the 
president is thinking about the expected payoff of a set of actions rather than odds of success 
during their current action. In the Agenda Setting Explanation, the president is thinking about 
public policy changes that could occur across the country or in the future if they take a given 
course of action today. Finally, in the Strategic Explanation, the president is thinking about their 
final payoff in the legislative process rather than their payoff at any one moment in time.  
 
Pursue = P(Success)*Payoff + Electoral + Agenda Setting + Strategic 
 
 
 The equation above represents a simple decision model in which each president has a 
specific threshold for when they will choose to pursue an issue. When the value of Pursue 
crosses that threshold, they will take a position, engage in debate, etc. They first estimate the 
probability of success and then multiply that by the payoff of success on the issue. After that, 
they add in any electoral incentives for pursuing the measure, the agenda setting value, and any 
sort of strategic leverage the bill could provide. If the the sum of the right hand side crosses the 
president’s pursuit threshold, they will pursue the issue. Previously implied models have focused 
exclusively on the probability of success and have failed to elaborate on the other variables at 
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play in the decision making process. You will notice that neither model predicts zero failure, but 
that the new model predicts more failure because it will be easier to cross the pursuit threshold 
given equal predictions about the likelihood of success. 
 These explanations fit together quite nicely into a seemingly obvious, but critical theory 
of presidential motivation. Presidents seek the maximum possible effect on public policy 
outcomes. While this conclusion seems simple, it actually brings with it some rather serious 
implications.  
 First, it gives us a more accurate criteria by which to judge presidents, even if that criteria 
makes the mechanics of that process incredibly difficult. Part of the attraction of the Roll Call 
Vote or Support Score based method of evaluating presidents is that those metrics are easy to 
calculate and quantify. The problem, however, is that if presidents are not trying to maximize 
those numbers then any sort of judgment based on them will lead us to faulty predictions and 
explanations of presidential behavior.  
The framework proposed in this paper essentially suggests that measuring presidential 
success is not possible without a painfully complicated matrix of policy outcomes and status 
quos. Additionally, this theory also includes the assumption that one should be careful when 
evaluating presidential success because we do not know what random chance would look like 
and need to develop a model that predicts how successful presidents could be if they were simply 
trying to follow Congress and how that prediction would change as the president gained 
experience.  
This does not mean that quantitative analysis of presidential behavior is misguided, but 
rather that the scope of inquiry must be broadened and that the focus should be on policy content 
instead of legislative procedure. The question we should be asking is how successful are 
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presidents at shaping public policy? This requires that we consider the policy the president 
wants, the status quo at the time of the proposal, and policy changes over time and across a wide 
variety of venues. The most concrete first step to testing this empirically would be to place the 
president’s failed proposals in Congress into the literature on policy diffusion in the states. 
 Second, this theory of motivation has serious implications for our theories of political 
leadership. Most work on executive leadership, specifically the presidency, is grounded in 
legislative models of leadership. The connection between the idea that presidents want to win 
votes on which they take positions and Cox and McCubbins’s (2005) cartel theory are quite 
clear. Cox and McCubbins theorize that majority parties in the U.S. House of Representatives 
will never want to lose a vote that the majority of their party opposes, which fits in line with the 
existing models of presidential motivation; When the president takes a position he or she does 
not want to lose. However, I argue that there are times in which losing is not costly and times in 
which it is actually a smart strategic choice. There is no reason to think that this vote-chasing 
goal motivates presidents other than that is how we have typically defined the goals of legislative 
leaders. Yet the American presidency is different than most chief executives and their goals are, 
therefore, likely different from other leaders. 
 The presence of so much failure suggests that presidents do not only seek to win votes on 
issues on which they take a position because they should be able to predict and avoid those 
situations if they chose to do so, meaning that they are selecting into failure. Failure is often 
costly for legislative leaders, but for American presidents, failure is part of the job description. 
They see it as their job to pursue items no one else wants to pursue and to shoulder the risk of 
those pursuits. They want to have the greatest possible impact on public policy and are 
comfortable with losing a number of battles along the way to ultimately win the war.  
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Returning to Granovetter’s threshold model and an extended metaphor can better 
illustrate this. If the goal of the president in our metaphor is to overthrow the established regime 
then he or she does not care much about how that overthrow takes place. What he or she cares 
about is that it happens at all. As a result, the president will do everything in his or her power to 
start a riot. He or she will break windows, flip over trash cans, and set fire to multiple cars with 
the hope that others will join in. The president cannot overthrow the regime on his or her own 
and there is no guarantee their actions will lead to a riot or that the riot will lead to a coup. What 
is critical here is that no one else is willing to be the first person to break a window, or at the 
very least, no one else has the ability to break a window so publicly. The president does not 
distinguish between a riot that failed because it did not grow large enough and a riot that failed 
because it never got started. A legislative leader would make that distinction. Losing because you 
could not persuade enough people and losing because you did not try are the same to the 
president, but different to the Speaker of the House. For too long, we have thought about the 
president through the lens of the legislature and this paper seems to suggest that is not an 
appropriate prism. 
This also is not simply a story about why the president proposes what he or she does in 
Congress. The executive-legislative dynamic discussed in this paper is just one of many 
consequences we would expect to see if the proposed motivating assumption is accurate. Most 
obviously, you could imagine this playing a significant role in the way a president conducts 
diplomatic interactions with foreign leaders. Rather than trying to gain a short term advantage, 
presidents focus on long run payoffs. This would also show up in the kinds of people the 
president chooses to appoint as federal judges, agency heads, and cabinet secretaries. We would 
also expect the president’s rhetorical strategy to be contingent on this premise. When they 
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choose their words, they choose them based on how they will impact politics over a long time 
period rather than how they will play during that particular news cycle. When presidents make 
decisions, they consider how those decisions will impact the thousands of other decisions they 
are going to make in the not-too-distant future. 
Finally, it is important to consider that even if the theory of presidential motivation 
provided here is incorrect, the need for a motivational theory of the presidency is critical. If we 
seek to understand elite level political behavior, or political behavior more broadly, we have to 
understand the goals of the subject. We need to know the resources available and the 
responsibilities with which they are tasked, but if we do not know what an actor hopes to 
accomplish then we have little chance of making useful predictions about their behavior or 
developing worthwhile explanations about their actions. 
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APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
1. Presidential Support Scores 
Edwards uses presidential support scores to measure legislative success as opposed to the 
Bond and Fleisher Roll Call approach which I utilize in the main text of the paper. As you can 
see below, this data supports the conclusion that 1) predicting support should be relatively easy 
2) that second term presidents get worse rather than better.  
The solid line in Figure 13 reflects the average yearly support from all members of the 
House while the dashed line reflects the average yearly support from members of the president’s 
party. The dotted line reflects average yearly support from the members of the opposition party. 
On average, the president has 50% support from the chamber, 71% support from his party, and 
30% support from the opposition on these votes. Figure 14 takes that same data and breaks it 
down by term, showing that presidents lose support from both their own members and the 
opposition members in their second term. 
Support Scores data can be found at http://presdata.tamu.edu/. 
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Figure 13: Presidential Support Scores (Edwards) on non-unanimous votes in the House on 
which the president took a stand and at least 20% of the chamber voted on each side of the issue.  
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Figure 14: Presidential Support Scores (Edwards) on non-unanimous votes in the House on 
which the president took a stand and at least 20% of the chamber voted on each side of the issue 
by term. 
 
2. Roll Call Voting Data 
The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. 
Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 
0111611, and were distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas 
at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the 
analysis reported here. 
In all analyses in this paper that make use of Roll Call data, votes are only included if 15 
percent of the chamber voted on each side of the issue so as not to include non-controversial 
votes such as those in support of Little League Baseball and other symbolic matters. This 
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practice is common in the literature, although some use 20 percent as a cutoff instead of 15. The 
choice is arbitrary, but in tests of the threshold, none of the findings presented are substantially 
altered. The only change is that in the 1993-2004 regression output (Table 1), the agenda 
variable is significant at .07 instead of .05 when using a slightly different cutoff point. This is 
likely just a matter of sample size as the Covington, Wright, Kinney (1995) paper finds agenda to 
be significant, as do the other analyses in this paper using the Beckmann data. 
The definition of “winning” in the context of Roll Call voting is always whether or not 
the president’s side won the vote. Positions and voting results come from the Policy Agendas 
Project, so their coding is utilized.  
In the Roll Call analysis of 1993-2004, other variables were coded into the PAP data. These 
variables include the partisan control of the chamber, the number of seats held by each party, the 
position of the two party leaders, and where that issue fell on the president’s agenda. The 
position of the party leaders was taken from DW-Nominate. Agenda, in this one analysis (Table 
1), was measured based on the president’s most recent major address to Congress (i.e SOTU, 
joint-addresses). If the president made no mention of the issue, it was off agenda. If the president 
mentioned the issue in passing or mentioned a related issue, it was coded as broad agenda. If the 
president made a specific policy proposal or set a specific policy goal, it was coded as core 
agenda. The difference between the last two categories would be as follows: 
● “We need to put people back to work.” Broad Agenda. 
● “We need to help people transition from welfare to work by offering them (specific 
proposal).” Core Agenda 
All coding was done by the author and has not been tested for intercoder reliability. However, 
the process by which the State of the Unions were coded and matched to votes was done with no 
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knowledge of the final vote’s success or failure. Use of bootstrapped standard errors and robust 
clustered standard errors did nothing to shift the overall findings. In some cases, the statistical 
significance level of certain control variables shifted from .05 to .06. 
 Figures 15 and 16 are predicted probabilities of success based on the logistic regression 
Model 2 in Table 1. Figure 15 shows predicted probabilities of success based on the item’s 
agenda status conditional on majority status, supportive leader support, opposing leader 
opposition, and a 51-49 percent partisan divide. Figure 16 shows the same thing with minority 
status and a 49-51 percent partisan divide. 
 
Figure 15: Predicted probability of success for majority presidents in the House given a 51-49 
majority, opposition from the minority leader, and support from the majority leader from 1993-
2004 on votes on which the president took a position and at least 15% of the chamber voted on 
each side (n=240). 
40 
 
Figure 16: Predicted probability of success for minority presidents in the House given a 49-51 
minority, opposition from the majority leader, and support from the minority leader from 1993-
2004 on votes on which the president took a position and at least 15% of the chamber voted on 
each side (n=352). 
 
3. Beckmann (2010) Data 
A full description of the data, which was provided generously by Matt Beckmann, can be 
found in the original author’s appendix, but a basic description of the data used in this paper is 
available here. Much of his data is drawn from Congressional Quarterly and what follows 
represents how the data was coded for use in this paper. 
● White House Proposal (Yes = 1, No = 0) 
● Did the president take a position? (Yes = 1, No = 0) 
● Did the president lobby Congress? (Yes = 1, No = 0) 
● The president was a different party than the House, Senate (Yes = 1, No = 0) 
● The president won (A new law was passed when the president wanted one or no law was 
passed when the president did not = 1, the opposite = 0) 
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Below is a regression output that shows the effect of position taking and lobbying on success 
with partisanship as a control variable. Figures 10 and 11 show the difference in success rate 
based on proposal status and lobbying approach. Tables 2 and 3 below show that these factors 
are still significant predictors when controlling for majority status in both chambers.  
 
4. The Senate 
The role of the Senate is clear in the Beckmann data and the data cited from Cohen 
(2012). I did not make use of Senate data in the Roll Call section because the PAP does not 
include the president’s position in their Senate voting database. That said, the pattern or failure is 
clear if you observe the data presented in Bond and Fleisher (1990) or explore Edwards’ support 
scores.  
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